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I. SHERMAN ACT BALANCING AND THE O'BANNON
C ASE ............................................ 370




Antitrust litigation often confronts situations where pre-
dicted effects point in both directions. If every important ef-
fect pointed the same way, the court could either dismiss the
complaint or else apply the rule of per se illegality. In most
serious cases, however, some factors indicate competitive
harm, while others suggest benefit. One often misunderstood
issue in addressing such practices is the role of balancing,
which courts often purport to do in cases under antitrust's
rule of reason.'
* Copyright © 2016 by Herbert Hovenkamp. J.D. 1978, University of
Texas; Ph.D. 1976 University of Texas; M.A. 1971, University of Texas; B.A.
1969 Calvin College. Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of
Iowa. Thanks to Scott Hemphill for commenting on a draft.
1. See, e.g., Gorlick Distrib. Centers, LLC v. Car Sound Exhaust Sys., Inc.,
723 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2013); Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conf., 101 F.3d
1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996) (requiring fact finder to consider whether an-
ticompetitive effects outweigh competitive effects); Tanaka v. Univ. of S.
Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001) (similar). Other decisions speak of
"net" effects, suggesting balancing although not doing it. Cal. Dental Ass'n v.
FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771, 782 (1999); At. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.
495 U.S. 328, 342 (1990) (per se and rule of reason analysis are ways of
369
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This paper argues that "balancing" is not a good descrip-
tion of what courts actually do in rule of reason cases under
the Sherman Act, although it more accurately describes
merger analysis under the 2010 Merger Guidelines
(Guidelines). "Balancing" requires values that can be cardi-
nally measured and weighed against each other. The factors
that are supposedly balanced in Sherman Act cases almost
never fit this description. Even if the things requiring balanc-
ing did come in cardinal units, most times the courts would
not have the tools necessary to make and apply the measure-
ments. Instead, balancing approaches are usually binary rather
than cardinal. They are more like off and on switches that go
in one direction or the other.
By contrast, merger analysis under the Guidelines concen-
trates on price effects, considering whether the downward
pricing pressure resulting from merger-induced efficiencies is
sufficient to offset the upward pricing pressure induced by the
merger itself.2 This is the only area where antitrust involves
meaningful balancing.
As a matter of statutory law and precedent, Sherman Act
rule of reason cases and merger cases seem very different from
one another, but they have important points in common. First
is a claim of competitive harm that requires the court to assess
the power and the severity of a threat to competition. Second
are offsetting justifications offered to show that the conduct is
competitively harmless to consumers or even perhaps benefi-
cial.
I.
SHERMAN ACT BALANCING AND THE O 'BANNON CASE
Aside from naked price fixing, market division, and a few
boycotts, most agreements among competitors are addressed
under the rule of reason, which requires the challenger to
show that the defendants collectively have market power and
that the agreement reduces or threatens to reduce competi-
determining "whether... anticompetitive effects outweigh ... procompeti-
tive effects," although not doing any balancing in this case). Additional deci-
sions are discussed infra, text at notes 5-9.
2. See discussion infra, text at notes 38-40.
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tion.3 Today, the courts pursue rule of reason analysis through
a verbal sequence something like this: first, the plaintiff has
the burden to show a prima facie anticompetitive restraint,
which requires proof of power and a threat of anticompetitive
effects. The burden then shifts to the defendant to show some
justification for the restraint. If the defendant succeeds, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who can then show that the
proffered justification was either a pretense or else that a sub-
stantially equivalent benefit could be achieved by a less restric-
tive alternative. If a less restrictive alternative is available, the
court condemns the restraint because the same effects could
have been achieved in a less anticompetitive manner. If no
such alternative is offered or available, the court must balance
the anticompetitive effects of the restraint against the non-
pretextual defense.
4
In its Apple e-Books decision, the Second Circuit believed
that the need to balance is what justifies application of anti-
trust's rule of reason, reflecting language in Supreme Court
decisions.5 The court then decided the case under the per se
rule, however, without doing any balancing because it involved
a naked restraint on price. Speaking of both Sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act in Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit stated, "courts
routinely apply a . . . balancing approach" under which "the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm ...
outweighs the procompetitive benefit."6 But then it decided
that case with almost no balancing, giving only some general
statements such as the need to "balance cost savings against
3. On multifirm exercises of market power, see 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOV'NKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw 1574 (4th ed. 2014).
4. See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
1504-1507 (3d ed. 2010).
5. United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 321 (2d Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 2016 WL 854227 (Mar. 7, 2016). See alsoJefferson Parish Hosp. Dist.
No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 33 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (balancing
involved in deciding whether to apply per se rule); Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 486-87 (1992) (Scalia, J. dissenting)
(difference between per se rule and rule of reason is that latter requires
balancing); Northwest Wholesale Stations, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing
Co., 472 U.S. 284, 290 (1985) (per se rule appropriate when "any offsetting
efficiency gains" are unlikely). See C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alterna-
tives in Antitrust Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), (discussing
these cases and others).
6. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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reduction in consumer choice," but not offering any metric
for doing so.7 If the defendant offered a nonpretextual de-
fense, the court simply accepted it, and it condemned behav-
iors for which no defense was offered. Even when courts de-
scribe this activity as balancing, they rarely discuss the impact
of the restraint on prices. Many never mention prices at all.8
While the Supreme Court has both accepted and rejected
defenses in rule of reason cases, it has only rarely described
this analysis as "balancing,"9 and it has never actually con-
ducted any balancing. In Oklahoma Board of Regents, the Court
considered an NCAA-imposed restraint on live broadcasting of
television games, together with a defense that the policy pro-
moted "athletically balanced competition." Without balancing
the factors, it agreed with the lower court's conclusion that
even if such a defense were legitimate, it could be achieved by
a less restrictive alternative. 10 The more recent Actavis decision
described earlier patent/antitrust cases as seeking to balance
patent rights and antitrust concerns for competition, but it
provided no metric for turning those interests into units capa-
7. Id. at 88. The court also used balancing language in upholding a
Microsoft restriction on alterations to the computer boot sequence to the
extent that its original equipment manufacturer (OEM) changes would have
made Microsoft's own interface completely invisible. The only actual balanc-
ing was the contrast between the "drastic alteration" of Microsoft's intellec-
tual property on the one hand, against the "marginal anticompetitive effect"
of prohibiting computer makers from substituting a different interface. See
id. at 63:
We agree that a shell that automatically prevents the Windows
desktop from ever being seen by the user is a drastic alteration of
Microsoft's copyrighted work, and outweighs the marginal anticom-
petitive effect of prohibiting the OEMs from substituting a differ-
ent interface automatically upon completion of the initial boot pro-
cess. We therefore hold that this particular restriction is not an ex-
clusionary practice that violates § 2 of the Sherman Act.
8. See, e.g., Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conf., 101 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1996);
Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Ca., 252 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2001).
9. One instance is a footnote in Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 57 n. 27 (1977), which defended the legitimacy of "balancing
intrabrand and interbrand competitive effects of vertical restrictions," but
suggested no calculus for doing this and did not even reference the impact
on prices or output. The Ninth Circuit accepted a balancing test in the Cali-
fornia Dental decision on remand. California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 224 F.3d
942 (9th Cir. 2000). However, the Supreme Court never embraced such bal-
ancing. See California Dental Assn. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
10. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 97 (1984).
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ble of being balanced."I Those earlier cases included such ad-
monitions as a court's obligation to "balance the privileges of
[the patentee] . . . with the prohibitions of the Sherman
Act." 12 The methodology that the Actavis Court actually devel-
oped, which involved looking for payments that were very
large in relation to anticipated litigation costs and the justifica-
tions for such payment, did not require balancing. The Leegin
case, which applied the rule of reason to resale price mainte-
nance (RPM) did not suggest balancing, although it did cite
one economic text indicating that the overall cost-benefit con-
sequences of RPM are "probably close.""- Other recent
Supreme Court decisions overturned lower courts and insisted
on the rule of reason, but without discussing balancing.'4 At
most, "balancing" for the Supreme Court refers to a few situa-
tions where the opposing harms and benefits are so grossly dis-
proportionate that the court regards the position of one side
or the other as almost frivolous.'
5
In fact, "balancing" is a very poor label for what courts
actually do. Balancing requires that two offsetting effects can
each be measured by some common cardinal unit, such as dol-
lars or tons or centimeters, and then weighed against each
other. The factors that courts consider under the rule of rea-
son rarely lend themselves to such treatment. For example, the
decisions referenced above that discuss the need to balance
"patent rights" against the "prohibitions of the Sherman Act"
provide nothing in the way of a calculus for weighing either of
11. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013) (discussing United
States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 390-91 (1948) and United States v.
Line Materials Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948)). See also New York ex rel.
Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 659-60 (2d Cir. 2015) (product-
hopping case tracking Actavis on this point).
12. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 390-91 (1948).
13. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889-90
(2007) (discussing FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: 558 (3d ed. 1990).
14. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher,
547 U.S. 1 (2006).
15. E.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) ("Ap-
plication of the Rule of Reason to these facts is not a matter of any great
difficulty") (asserting that the need to protect patient care did not justify a
dentist group's collective decision to withhold patient X-rays from an insurer
in order to enable it to verify claims without discussing balancing). See also
supra text accompanying note 7.
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these interests. At best, "balancing" in such cases depends on a
complex mixture of soft economic and even ideological judg-
ments about the effectiveness and appropriate domain of the
patent system against concerns about promoting competition.
A Ninth Circuit case considering a liquor price posting provi-
sion declared that the court must balance the state's interest in
promoting temperance with the federal interest in promoting
competition. 16 It is a little like balancing pride and prejudice,
or harmony and ecstasy.
The Ninth Circuit's 2015 decision in O'Bannon v. NCAA
involved a player challenge to NCAA member agreements gov-
erning compensation for college football players.1 7 One of
these was an NCAA rule that prohibited member colleges from
giving student athletes scholarship support up to the full cost
of college attendance, including room, board, and collateral
expenses.'I Rather, the agreement capped compensation at a
lower amount. The other was a rule that forbade athletes from
being compensated by would-be endorsers or licensees for
their names, images, or likenesses.19
The district court found an anticompetitive restraint, but
accepted on principle the NCAA's defense that the rules were
consistent with its efforts to protect 'amateurism' in collegiate
athletics. It found two substantially less restrictive alternatives,
however. On compensation, it found that NCAA member
schools should be permitted to give students scholarships and
grants that would cover the full cost of college attendance. Sec-
ond, it held that member schools should be permitted individ-
ually to set aside deferred cash compensation for use of the
students' names, images, and likenesses, so it struck down the
agreement forbidding such compensation.
2
1
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that both
sets of restrictions were prima facie anticompetitive but were at
least partially justified by concerns about amateurism, which
according to the Supreme Court must be given ample lati-
16. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 902 (9th Cir. 2008).
17. O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015), petition for cert.
filed, - U.S.L.W. - (U.S. Mar. 14, 2016) (No. 15-1167).
18. Id. at 1074.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1052.
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tude.2 1 As a result it was necessary to determine whether these
same goals could be furthered by less restrictive alternatives.
Under Ninth Circuit law, proffered less restrictive alternatives
must be "virtually as effective" in serving the NCAA's concerns
about amateurism and "without significantly increased cost."
22
The Ninth Circuit also agreed that permitting student ath-
lete compensation to rise to the full cost of attendance, but
not more, could preserve amateurism. Here, "[b]y the NCAA's
own standards, student-athletes remain amateurs as long as
any money paid to them goes to cover legitimate educational
expenses." Thus,
In holding that setting the grant-in-aid cap at student-
athletes' full cost of attendance is a substantially less
restrictive alternative under the Rule of Reason, we
are not declaring that courts are free to
micromanage organizational rules or to strike down
largely beneficial market restraints with impunity.
Rather, our affirmance of this aspect of the district
court's decision should be taken to establish only that
where, as here, a restraint is patently and inexplicably
stricter than is necessary to accomplish all of its
procompetitive objectives, an antitrust court can and
should invalidate it and order it replaced with a less
restrictive alternative.2 3
The Ninth Circuit concluded, however, that permitting
students to receive deferred compensation for their names,
images, and likenesses did not meet its test for an appropriate
less restrictive alternative. Allowing the students to receive
such compensation would "vitiate"24 their amateur status to
the extent that it would increase their remuneration beyond
the cost of college attendance. The court thus drew a hard line
at an unweighted concept of amateurism that permitted the
NCAA to limit students to full college costs. It also rejected the
district court's conclusion that that these sums would be mod-
21. Id. at 1074 (discussing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120
(1984) and Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1022 (10th Cir. 1998) ("[C]ourts
should afford the NCAA plenty of room under the antitrust laws to preserve
the amateur character of intercollegiate athletics.").
22. Id. at 1074 (quoting County of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236
F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001)).
23. Id. at 1075.
24. Id. at 1077.
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est, indicating that it is not an antitrust function to regulate
the size of a restraint, but only its existence. As the court ob-
served:
The difference between offering student-athletes ed-
ucation-related compensation and offering them
cash sums untethered to educational expenses is not
minor; it is a quantum leap. Once that line is
crossed, we see no basis for returning to a rule of am-
ateurism and no defined stopping point; we have lit-
tle doubt that plaintiffs will continue to challenge the
arbitrary limit imposed by the district court until they
have captured the full value of their NIL. At that
point the NCAA will have surrendered its amateurism
principles entirely and transitioned from its "particu-
lar brand of football" to minor league status.25 In
light of that, the meager evidence in the record, and
the Supreme Court's admonition that we must afford
the NCAA "ample latitude" to superintend college
athletics, we think it is clear the district court erred in
concluding that small payments in deferred compen-
sation are a substantially less restrictive alternative re-
straint.2
6
To summarize, the court concluded that (1) the agree-
ments limiting student compensation were prima facie a re-
straint on trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act; but (2)
concerns about preserving amateurism justified the NCAA's
rules prohibiting compensation in excess of the full cost of col-
lege attendance by eligible athletes; but (3) these concerns did
not justify rules setting compensation rates lower than that
amount.
The district court's "less restrictive alternative," which per-
mitted students to receive deferred compensation in a trust
fund of up to $5000 per student per year of eligibility, was re-
ally nothing more than disguised price administration. For ex-
ample, if members of a joint venture are found to be unlaw-
25. Id. at 1079 (citing NCAAv. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101-02, 120.
26. Id. One panel member dissented on this point, concluding that there
was ample support in the record for the district court's conclusion that per-
mitting small amounts of deferred compensation for students' names,
images, and likenesses was a satisfactory less restrictive alternative. Id. at
1079-82.
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fully fixing prices at ten dollars, lowering the price to eight
dollars is not the type of less restrictive alternative contem-
plated by antitrust law. In this case the line between 'amateur'
and 'professional' athletics was a well-established benchmark
that courts had repeatedly approved.27 In its own NCAA deci-
sion, the Supreme Court had emphasized the historic role of
the NCAA in promoting amateurism in intercollegiate athlet-
ics.28 'Metering' small deviations is not an appropriate anti-
trust function any more than is the defense that a price fix is
lawful if the fixed price is 'reasonable.' The court did not bal-
ance, but rather applied a purely binary distinction between
amateur and professional play.
Consider the options available to an antitrust court in this
case. It could have struck down all horizontal agreements cap-
ping compensation or limiting the players' ability to market
their own names, images, and likenesses. In larger schools this
would very likely have ended amateur collegiate athletics in
27. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 345 (7th Cir. 2012); Bassett v.
NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 2008) (upholding restrictions on recruit-
ment of student athletes); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1345 (5th
Cir. 1988) (upholding compensation restrictions); Pocono Invitational
Sports Camp, Inc. v. NCAA, 317 F. Supp. 2d 569, 584, 587 (E.D. Pa. 2004)
(NCAA eligibility rules are noncommercial); Adidas Am., Inc., v. NCAA, 40
F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1286 (D. Kan. 1999) (NCAA restriction on size and type of
manufacturing company logo that NCAA players could wear on their uni-
form was intended to preserve amateurism); Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180,
187 (3d Cir. 1998), vacated on other (Title IX) grounds, 55 U.S. 459 (1999)
(NCAA's enforcement of bylaw preventing post-baccalaureate student from
participating in athletics at school different from the one in which she did
her undergraduate work was not a commercial act and thus not within Sher-
man Act's coverage); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 747 (M.D. Tenn.
1990) (upholding no-draft and no-agent rules); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F.
Supp. 356, 383 (D. Ariz. 1983) (upholding compensation rules); Jones v.
NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 304 (D. Mass. 1975) (upholding eligibility stan-
dards and rule restricting athletic scholarships). Cf Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S.
at 123 (White,J., dissenting, noting unchallenged NCAA rules limiting com-
pensation for student athletes). See also id. at 124 (noting "NCAA's funda-
mental policy of preserving amateurism and integrating athletics and educa-
tion"), Several of these decisions also held that amateur collegiate athletics is
not "commercial" activity, at least when it does not pertain to explicitly com-
mercial contracts. See IB PHILLIP E. AR.EDA & HERBERT HOVWNKAMP, ANTI-
TRUST LAw 1 262 (4th ed. 2013). For a different perspective, see Michael A.
Carrier, How Not to Apply the Rule of Reason Case, 114 MICH. L. REv. FIRST
IMPRKSSIONS 73 (2015).
28. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 88, 96, 101, 119.
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high revenue sports, transforming the more successful players
into professional athletes. If they were to unionize, any agree-
ment they made with the universities respecting their own
compensation would be assessed under the nonstatutory labor
exemption to the antitrust laws, provided it was made in the
context of collective bargaining. This describes the relation-
ship between player compensation and professional athletes.29
The O'Bannon court could also have done what the dis-
trict court did, which was to require that payments for names
and likenesses of at least $5000 per year of eligibility be placed
into a trust account for players until after they graduated. The
district court reached this conclusion by holding that the con-
cerns about amateurism were legitimate, but that the trust ac-
count was a less restrictive alternative." However, that ap-
proach is nothing more than price regulation, equivalent to
adjusting a cartel's price thought to be either too high or too
low. In this case, the NCAA is a cartel of buyers, agreeing to
suppress the price that they pay for student athletes.31 The
point of the less restrictive alternative test is not to turn the
antitrust court into a price regulator, but rather to find competi-
tive alternatives to a challenged restraint.
Third, the court could simply define what it means to be
an "amateur" athlete, relying on a line of cases stretching back
to the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in the Oklahoma Board of
Regents case.3 2 That status operated as an important binary
switch, identifying a dividing line that had frequently been
cited by both the courts and the NCAA's own standards.
Under this view, "uncompensated" play meantjust that: NCAA
members could not collectively suppress compensation below
the cost of education, nor could they agree to more. "Balanc-
ing" was not necessary, or else it meant nothing more than
accepting the NCAA's concerns about amateurism as legiti-
mate and identifying the singular spot that best satisfies them.
To be sure, there are other problems at work here. For
example, some colleges and universities earn millions of dol-
29. E.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (multi-team
collective bargaining in NFL). See ARE EDA & HOVNKAMP, supra note 3, at
256.
30. See O'Bannon F.3d 955, 982-83 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
31. On price fixing by buyers, see 12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAw 2010-2015 (3th ed. 2012).
32. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 97.
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lars from their high profile football and basketball programs,
essentially taking a free ride on the backs of their student ath-
letes. Further, paying them more may be a way of preventing
collegiate superstars from quitting school early in order to play
professionally. This is just another way of saying that antitrust
cannot correct every market irregularity. Any fix that addresses
all of these problems will probably have to come from
Congress, and there is ample precedent for it to do so.-3
II.
MERGERS, PRIMA FACIE ILLEGALITY, AND EFFICIENCIES
Prior to revised Guidelines issued during the Reagan ad-
ministration, the antitrust law of mergers was much like rule of
reason analysis in Sherman Act Section 1 cases. The courts
spoke in broad terms about "injury to competition" or "pro-
tecting" competition rather than competitors,34 but the refer-
ences were vague and never accompanied by a useable unit of
measurement. However, over a series of increasingly pointed
revisions, the Guidelines have re-defined the goal as proscrib-
ing mergers that realistically threaten higher consumer prices.
Mergers may also produce offsetting efficiencies, but these ef-
ficiencies will be credited only if they are sufficient to offset
any price increase that the merger threatens.
35
The Guidelines provide merger policy with something
that the Sherman Act rule of reason lacks-namely, an ap-
proach that makes balancing at least theoretically possible.
Mergers are subjected to a structural or behavioral test under
either a coordinated effects theory or a unilateral effects the-
ory, whose models predict the likely post-merger price in-
33. Cf Jung v. Assn. of Am. Medical Colleges, 184 Fed. Appx. 9 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (describing Congressionally created exemption to Sherman Act after
district court condemned medical college residency matching program
tinder antitrust laws; dismissing complaint).
34. E.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277-82 (1966)
(concern to "protect competition against ever increasing concentration
through mergers"); United States v. Phila. Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362
(1963) (Clayton Act requires "appraisal of the immediate impact of the
merger upon competition," but not discussing price); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (goal is to protect competition, not
competitors, but not associating competition with lower prices).
35. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 10 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 GUIDELINES], https://www.ftc.
gov/sites /default/ files/attachmen ts/ merger-review/ 100819hmg.pdf.
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crease after providing a generalized "credit" for efficiencies. 3
In litigation, that test represents the government's prima facie
challenge to the merger on the theory that prices are likely to
rise. If the test is met, then the burden shifts to the defendant
to show efficiencies that outweigh the credit. These efficien-
cies must be both merger-specific, which means that they
would not likely occur absent the merger, and also of suffi-
cient magnitude to reduce the predicted price to no higher
than premerger levels.
37
Although the Guidelines give the enforcement agencies
wiggle room, their stated test for competitive harm approxi-
mates a "consumer welfare" standard. In antitrust parlance,
"consumer welfare" measures the impact of a practice on con-
sumers, principally consumer prices, after accounting for off-
setting producer gains. A merger is acceptable only if efficien-
cies are sufficient to ensure that prices after the merger are no
higher than they were prior to the merger. By contrast, a "gen-
eral welfare" test nets consumer losses and producer gains
against each other, proclaiming a practice to be efficient if
producer gains exceed consumer losses, even if consumer
losses are real. While the Guidelines never speak expressly of
"consumer welfare," they do make post-merger price increases
the central standard for assessing merger illegality. A merger is
lawful only if, after efficiencies are considered, consumers are
unharmed.
The government's approach under the Guidelines has
provoked the criticism that the government's burden in mak-
ing out a prima facie case is relatively simple, relying mainly on
structural evidence and predictions extrapolated from ob-
served responses to price changes, while the defendants must
provide concrete evidence of offsetting efficiencies.
38
36. See Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal
Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition, 10 B.EJ. THEOREuTICAL
EcoN. 1, 9-10 (2010); Dennis Carlton, Revising the Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines, 6J. COMPETITION L. & EcON. 619, 641-44 (2011); GregoryJ. Werden &
Luke Froeb, Choosing Among Tools for Assessing Unilateral Merger Effect, 7 EUR.
COMPETITIONJ. 155 (2011).
37. 2010 GUIDElINES, supra note 35.
38. E.g., In re Ardagh Group S.A., and Saint-Gobain Containers, Inc.,
and Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, FTC File No. 131-0087 (F.T.C. Apr. 11,
2014) (Wright, Comm'r, dissenting) (protesting that "the burden facing the
agency with respect to the likelihood of anticompetitive effects should be in
parity with that faced by the parties with respect to efficiencies").
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However, this criticism is not well founded. Firstly, when
the government makes a prima facie case, it already takes into
account what might be considered 'ordinary' or typical effi-
ciency gains that mergers are likely to produce. Particularly for
unilateral effects mergers, it uses a presumptive formulation,
assuming efficiency gains of as much as ten percent.39 The effi-
ciencies defense is thus relevant only for substantial efficien-
cies that exceed those already accounted for in the govern-
ment's evaluation.
Secondly, efficiencies relate to the production and distri-
bution processes of the merging firms themselves, so this infor-
mation is uniquely in their possession. Further, firms are re-
sponsible to their shareholders and the failure rate for merg-
ers is quite high. A large percentage of acquiring firms lose
money both in the short and middle term after a merger.40 As
a result, one must presume that firms research very carefully
before making an acquisition. At least the acquiring firm
should have pretty good information about the source of any
increased profits from a merger. The burdens that the law as-
signs are consistent with the types and quality of information
that the parties control.
One additional and rather sobering fact is the record of
post-merger pricing. In 2007, the Antitrust Modernization
Commission suggested that empirical studies be done con-
cerning post-merger price and output performance.4 1 Several
of these studies have now been conducted, but more are
39. Herbert Hovenkanip, Antitrust and Efficient Mergers, - GEO. MASON L.
REv. - (2017), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stractid=2664266.
40. BARBARA S. PETITr & KENNETH R. FERRIS, VALUATION FOR MERGERS
AND ACQUISITIONS 8-9 (2d ed. 2013) (value of acquired firms go up in short
term, while value of acquirer declines in both short and medium term); G.A.
Jarrell, James A. Brickley, & Jeffry M Netter, The Market for Corporate Control:
The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 53 (1988) (successful
bidders in tender offers showed statistically significant gains in market value
in the 1960's and 1970's, but statistically insignificant losses in the 1980's).
41. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
61 (2007) (urging under Recommendation 10b that the agencies to do
more retrospective research on effects of merger enforcement decisions). See
also Orley C. Ashenfelter, Daniel Hosken, & Matthew Weinberg, Generating
Evidence to Guide Merger Enforcement (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 14798, 2009), http://www.nber.org/papers/w14798.pdf
(describing the necessity of retrospective analysis of past mergers in building
an empirical basis for antitrust enforcement).
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needed before we can draw strong conclusions.42 Many of the
studies examine "marginally legal" mergers-that is, mergers
that were close to the threshold for illegality under the
Guidelines' standards at the time they were examined but
were nevertheless allowed to proceed, in some cases after par-
tial divestitures or other relief. The majority of these studies
reveal post-merger price increases, some of which are substan-
tial. The methodologies of some of these studies have been
criticized, however, and clearly more work needs to be done.43
In any event, assuming that a significant portion of these
studies are correct, several alternative explanations could be
considered. The most obvious one is that the standards for
prima facie illegality articulated in the Guidelines are too leni-
ent, at least as the agencies apply them. As a result, too many
anticompetitive mergers are permitted. Another is that the
government's blanket presumptions about merger efficiencies
are too generous. It is unlikely, however, that post-merger
price increases occur because the government has accepted ef-
ficiency defenses too readily. In fact very few merging parties
have succeeded in proving efficiencies sufficient to undermine
a prima facie case against a merger.
The Merger Guidelines as currently formulated are an in-
stance of balancing done right. First, stating consumer price
increases as the principal concern creates a unit of measure
that makes balancing at least conceptually possible. Second,
whatever the relative advantages or disadvantages of a con-
sumer welfare test, the fact is that the consumer price test ar-
ticulated in the Guidelines is easier to administer than a gen-
eral welfare test. In order to estimate general welfare effects,
one must be able to quantify consumer harm, which includes
not only higher prices but also deadweight loss. This requires
information about the shape of the demand curve. In addi-
tion, offsetting efficiencies must be assessed and netted out.
This requires a court to look not only at per unit cost savings,
but also at the output over which those costs will be spread. If
42. For a catalog, see Hovenkamp, Efficient Mergers, supra note 39; JOHN
KwoKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALY-
SIS OF U.S. POLICY (2014). See also Orley Ashenfelter, Daniel Hosken, & Mat-
thew Weinberg, Did Robert Bork Understate the Competitive Impact of Mergers?
Evidence from Consummated Mergers, 57J.L. & ECON. S67 (2014).
43. GregoryJ. Werden, Inconvenient Truths on Merger Retrospective Studies, 3
J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 287 (2015).
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the merger actually raises prices, then any achievable efficien-
cies will have to occur at lower output levels than prior to the
merger. While that is hardly impossible, the range of efficien-
cies available at a reduced output is significantly less than the
range that results from an output increase.
44
By contrast, the consumer price approach taken in the
Guidelines requires purely "vertical" queries about how much
the merger tends to push prices up, and what the downward
price adjustment resulting from the efficiencies would be. In
most cases, both of those numbers are much easier to deter-
mine.
CONCLUSION
Whether the Guidelines approach to balancing can be mi-
grated to general antitrust litigation under the rule of reason
depends on the challenged practice. Joint ventures that have
efficiency potential but threaten higher prices from collusion
are a likely candidate. Practices that threaten exclusion are
more difficult to evaluate. Practices whose consequences how
up in the longer run will be particularly difficult, as will prac-
tices for which the defense has little to do with measurable
prices. In any event, if the court cannot articulate a cardinal
unit of measurement such as dollars for assessing competitive
harm and offsetting efficiencies, then what it ends up doing is
not "balancing."
In the vast majority of rule of reason cases, even complex
ones such as, O'Bannon, real balancing is not necessary. The
series of steps-first prima facie case, then defense, and occa-
sionally inquiry into less restrictive alternatives-will be suffi-
cient. Care must be taken to ensure that the defense is one
that is really specific to the challenged practice-that is, that
the efficiencies could not be earned otherwise than by the
challenged venture. In addition, the tribunal must be sure that
the proffered less restrictive alternatives ameliorate any com-
petitive concerns and are realistically available. Close cases
should be relatively rare, and when they arise, courts should
lean toward dismissal when markets are poorly defined or
shares are on the lower edge of illegality. In the rare event that
balancing is necessary, courts should be aware that unless they
44. See Hovenkamp, supra note 39.
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have specific, quantifiable amounts to attach to competitive
threats and offsetting gains, they are in hazardous territory.
For that reason the courts should get out of the business of
"balancing" abstractions, such as the impact on competition
against the rights conferred by the patent system.45 Values
such as these are impossible to balance, except when they are
so lopsided that little more than a casual observation is needed
to determine that one is more significant than the other.
Finally, it is important not to forget that historically the
equitable power of courts has been greater in Section 1 cases
than in merger cases, and can be asserted over a wider range.
As a result, remedies can be much more modest or more finely
calibrated. For example, the remedies in the Board of Regents
and O'Bannon cases were not to dissolve the NCAA or force
divestitures, but rather to enjoin enforcement of the specific
rules limiting the number of televised games in the first case,
or the agreements limiting compensation in the second. This
cy pres power of judges should not be overlooked. Just as con-
tractual arrangements come in infinite varieties, they can also
be fixed in infinite ways.
45. See discussion supra, text at notes 10-12.
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